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COMMENTS
ASSUMING JURISDICTION ARGUENDO: THE
RATIONALE AND LIMITS OF HYPOTHETICAL
JURISDICTION
Early in April of 1978, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia announced its opinion in the case of Edwards v.
Carter.' Without deciding several threshold challenges to its jurisdiction, the court rendered judgment on the merits of a novel constitutional question of importance to the future of the Panama
Canal Treaty 2 then pending in the Senate.
The treaty, as presented to the Senate by President Carter, contained provisions for transferring substantial amounts of United
States property in the Canal Zone to Panama.3 This proposed property transfer raised the issue, hotly debated in the Senate and decided by the court, whether the President's power to make treaties
with the advice and consent of the Senate - includes the power to
dispose of United States-owned property, or whether the disposal
power is exclusively vested in the entire Congress by article IV of
the Constitution.5
The plaintiffs, Representative Mickey Edwards and fifty-nine
of his colleagues in the House of Representatives, sued President
Carter, requesting a declaratory judgment that only the entire Congress could dispose of the U.S.-owned Canal Zone property, and that
it thus could not be transferred to Panama through the exercise of
the treaty power alone. The district court ruled that the congressmen lacked standing, and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.6 On appeal, the President urged affirmance on the standing
ground, arguing additionally that the issue was not yet ripe and
that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question. Characterizing these questions as "substantial and complex," the court
1580
F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).
2
Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, United States-Panama, S. ExEc. Doc.
N, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (to enter into force Oct. 1, 1979). The full text
of the treaty is set forth in an appendix to Edwards, 580 F.2d at 1104-21.

3 The property transfer is set out in article XIII of the treaty, repiinted in 580
F.2d at 1114-15.
4 U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, ci. 2.
5Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
6Edwards v. Carter, 445 F. Supp. 1279, 1286 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 580 F.2d 1055
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).
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of appeals nevertheless found it unnecessary to address them 7 and
proceeded directly to the merits, dismissing the complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.8
As support for this unusual procedure, the court relied upon
the authority of an increasing number of cases in which federal
courts, confronted with difficult and far-reaching jurisdictional challenges, have assumed jurisdiction arguendo and proceeded to deny
relief on the merits.
This practice of assuming jurisdiction arguendo, here dubbed
"hypothetical jurisdiction," has developed for the most part without
examination. The Supreme Court case most often cited as precedent, United States v. Augenblick,9 offers not a single word of
analysis or justification, and little more has been forthcoming in
more recent cases. 10 As a result, the policy underlying hypothetical
jurisdiction has not been articulated and the proper limits of its
exercise remain unexplored. The potential for serious abuse, which
this Comment maintains was realized in the conduct of the Edwards
v. Carter court," necessitates such an inquiry.
This Comment contends that the principled exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction can avoid unnecessary consideration of constitutional questions, conserve judicial resources, and aid in the administration of justice. Part I discusses the traditional policies of
federal jurisdiction militating against hypothetical jurisdiction, and
pays particular attention to jurisprudential considerations that have
undercut the absolute nature of traditional jurisdictional rules.
Part II sets forth the policy considerations justifying judicial power
to exercise hypothetical jurisdiction. Part III sifts through the developing case law of hypothetical jurisdiction, attempting in the
process to filter out guidelines for its discretionary use. In Part IV,
Edwards v. Carteris reexamined in light of the guidelines for hypothetical jurisdiction developed in the preceeding sections.

I. TiH

JURISDICTIONAL AXIOm

The thesis of hypothetical jurisdiction-that a federal court
may render a valid judgment on the merits while expressly
7 580

F.2d at 1056-57.
8Id. 1064.
9393 U.S. 348 (1969).
10 See, e.g., Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 532 (1975); Secretary of the Navy v.
Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974); Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 874 (1977).
11 See text accompanying notes 197-217 infra.
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avoiding jurisdictional challenges to its power to hear the caseseems illogical. It appears to contradict the traditional principle
that courts are powerless to act without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and that any order or judgment issued by a court without
such jurisdiction is void and unenforceable. 12 This axiom of jurisdiction, 13 which to legal ears has the ring of analytic truth, nevertheless reflects a choice, supported and delimited by considerations of
policy. 4 In order to discover whether an exception for hypothetical
jurisdiction can be tolerated, it is first necessary to take a closer
look at the origins, justifications, and contours of this jurisdictional
axiom.
Unlike jurisdiction over the person, which may be waived, 15
jurisdiction over the subject matter may not, and can be challenged
at any time.1 If any federal court perceives a problem of subject
matter jurisdiction at any time prior to final judgment, it must
raise the issue on its own motion, even though the parties do not
wish to contest the issue, and must dismiss the action if jurisdiction
is found lacking.17 If the court reaches the merits of a dispute
without expressly addressing subject matter jurisdiction, a finding
20
9
of jurisdiction is implied.' 8 Likewise, lack of standing,' ripeness,
12 See, e.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951); United States
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940); In re Sawyer,
124 U.S. 200, 220-22 (1888); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514
(1869); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 240, 268-69 (1808); The Marshalsea, 77
Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1612); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLCT OF LAWS
§ 92, Comment i (1972).
13 "Axiom of jurisdiction" or "jurisdictional axiom" is used in this Comment as
an umbrella term for a number of rules and doctrines, differentiated in the following

text, all of which have as their common source the notion that subject matter jurisdiction is a necessary condition of judicial power. Although the jurisdictional axiom
is not confined to the federal court system, this Comment will consider it only in
that context.
No attempt will be made to define "subject matter jurisdiction," except to
distinguish it from jurisdiction over the person. See generally Dobbs, The Decline
of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C. L. REv. 49, 49 n.1 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Consent].
14 United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514
(1940); Consent, supra note 13, at 52.
15 Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 350 U.S. 495 (1956); FED. R. Civ. P.
& E. CooPEs, 5 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
12(h) (1); C. WRxcar, A. Mit,
PRocEDua § 1391 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Wacnr & mLER].

16 American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951); Mitchell v.
Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934); Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
126, 127 (1804); FED. R. Crv. P. 12(h)(3); 5 Wnicrr & MnrazR, supra note 15, at
§ 1393.
17 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 740 (1976); Mansfield, C. &
L.M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382-89 (1884).
18 Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1938).

19 Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331 (1977).
o Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138 (1974).
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and mootness 21 are all issues that the court has a duty to decide.22
Similarly, whether a case presents a non-justiciable political quesdon, although not a jurisdictional question in the same sense as
subject matter and case or controversy requirements, 23 is nevertheless a threshold inquiry that the court has an obligation to under24

take*

"First principles" often lose their luster when examined in the
light of their history, which is frequently filled with accident and
devoid of logic. Professor Dobbs has traced the development of the
jurisdictional axiom to the English royal courts, which used the concept of coram non judice to assert a national jurisdiction at the

expense of traditional local tribunals. Royal courts voided the
judgments of ecclesiastical or "inferior" courts for want of jurisdiction, thereby creating a process of review that permitted "superior" royal courts to correct injustices. 25 Exactly why jurisdiction over the subject matter and not jurisdiction over the person
became the peculiar test of a court's authority is unclear,20 but it is
thought that its plasticity as a concept, its appearance on the face
of the record, and its effectiveness as a counterweight to the largely
territorial limits on the jurisdiction of English courts account for
its eventual prominence. 27 Although articulated by Coke early in
the seventeenth century, subject matter jurisdiction as a necessary
condition of a valid judgment did not gain wide acceptance until
the next century, and was only elevated to black-letter law by the
late Victorian text-writers.2 8
A. The Rule Against Waiver
The jurisdictional axiom's functional origins and its close ties
to the idiosyncratic historical development of the English court
system naturally raise the question of its continuing value in the
modem judicial environment. Criticism has been focused on that
21Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119 (1977); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S.

244, 246 (1971).
22

See Pugh, The Federal Declaratory Remedy: Jurisdiction and Related

Problems, 6 V. ND. L. REv. 79, 84-96 (1952).
23

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-99 (1962). See generally Scharpf, Judicial
and the Political Question: A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE LJ. 517 (1966).
Review
24
Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 954 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
25
See Consent, supra note 13, at 54-66; Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power
and jurisdictionalAttacks on Judgments, 87 YALE L.J. 164, 165-71 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Filling the Void].
26
Gavit, Jurisdictionof Courts, 11 IND. LJ. 524, 546-47 (1936).
27 Consent, supra note 13, at 75-78.
28 Id.
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aspect of the axiom that prohibits waiver of subject matter jurisdiction, allowing jurisdictional challenges to be raised at any time prior
to final judgment,29 on the grounds that it encourages unsound
judicial administration 30 and violates principles of fundamental
31
fairness.
If, as critics of the rule against waiver have proposed, the
opportunity to raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction should
be foreclosed to the parties and to the court at some point prior
to final judgment on the merits, the policies underlying the present
rule must be addressed. The first of these policies is avoidance of
the danger that a court will be compelled to render judgment in a
case lying beyond the article III judicial power of the federal
courts. 32 Second, even if the case is within article III bounds,
exercising jurisdiction in excess of specific congressional grants may
violate principles of federalism by encroaching on state court
powers. Third, the weeding function now performed by subject
matter jurisdictional requirements may be jeopardized; 33 although
the current rule may encourage temporary concealment of jurisdic291 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE f0.60(4), at 631-32 (2d ed. 1948); Al
STDy

OF

mE DmsIoN oF JURISDICTION BETwEEN

STATE AND

FEDxA.L

CoURTS

§ 1386 & 366-74 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI STuDy]; Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment,
51 Mn-N. L. Rxv. 491 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Beyond Bootstrap]. Postjudgment application of the jurisdictional axiom has not been a problem for several
decades because judgments issuing from courts lacking jurisdiction are res judicata.
See text accompanying notes 50-58 infra.
30 The federal courts, it is true, are courts of limited jurisdiction. jurisdiction represents the distribution of judicial power in our federal system
as blueprinted by the Constitution and declared by Congress; and the
federal courts ought therefore to be mindful that they stay within defined
limits. These are broad working principles and ought not to be applied
destructively.
1 MoorE's FrEDERAL PaAcncx ff 0.60(4), at 631 (2d ed. 1948).
31American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951), is the classic
example. Defendant succeeded in removing the case to the federal district court,
which found for plaintiff. Defendant then won on appeal on the ground that the
removal was improper because the district court lacked jurisdiction. See also
Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437
U.S. 365 (1978). But see Di Frischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141
(3d Cir. 1960); Klee v. Pittsburgh & W.Va. Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1958),
noted in Stephens, Estoppel to Deny Federal Jurisdiction-Klee and Di Frischia
Break Ground, 68 Dicx. L. REv. 39 (1963).
32 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
").
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ....
33" 'If this [jurisdiction by mere consent of the parties] were once conceded, the
Federal courts would become the common resort of persons who have no right,
either under the Constitution or the laws of the United States, to litigate in those
courts."' American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 18 n.17 (1951) (quoting
People's Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 260 (1880)).
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tional defects, not all cases fall into that category, and once a defect
becomes apparent, the court is freed of further expenditures of judicial energies. Fourth, the rule as it exists encourages fairness insofar as a party unable to launch a timely attack upon the court's
jurisdiction is given a second chance.
The American Law Institute has placed its weight behind a
proposal to legislatively curtail this jurisdictional fetish M by prohibiting the consideration of subject matter jurisdiction once trial
has commenced or other disposition on the merits has occurred in
the district court.35 Exceptions would prevent collusion, unfairness
to the party unable to raise timely objections, and the foreclosure
of objections to defects that rise to a constitutional level. 30
This last exception for constitutional defects was included
as a safety valve at the insistence of the Institute, despite the Reporters' view that it was unnecessary.37 In the Reporters' opinion
article III is flexible enough to justify restricting objections to
jurisdictional defects in order to further sound judicial administration: "It is necessary and proper to exercise of Article III power
that procedures be devised to require issues of jurisdiction to be
timely raised, and to prevent their use to take unfair advantage of
opposing parties or to impede the administration of justice." 3s
Whether or not the Reporters' assessment of article III's flexibility
is accurate, the inclusion of the exception for constitutional defects
obviates concern over possible judgments beyond the court's article
III power.
Neither the proposal nor the commentary explicitly addresses
the potential for encroachment on state judicial power, an omission
that seems odd in view of attempts to explain the harshness of the
existing rule as arising from vigilant federalism. 39 The ALI proposal, however, does contain adequate safeguards against significant
alteration of the federal-state balance. First, it is possible that the
judiciary would extend the exception for jurisdictional defects of
constitutional stature to include jurisdictional flaws based on dis34

Professor Moore uses the term "fetish" to describe the rule that subject matter
jurisdiction can be raised at any time. 1 Mooxs FkoiuiA PRAcTMCE f 0.60(4),

at 624-32 (2d ed. 1948).

The fetish is narrower than the jurisdictional axiom.

note 13 & text accompanying note 12 supra.

35 ALI S=TnY, supra note 29, at § 1386.
36Id. § 1386(a)(2), (3), (5).
37 Id. 368-69, 373.

38 Id. 368.
39 See, e.g., 13 WmGHT &

UfLR, supra note 15, at § 3522.

See
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cretionary principles in support of state power. 40 Even if such
extension were not to occur, other provisions of the proposal would
serve to protect against federal intrusions into state power by ensuring that jurisdictional missteps were rare. The parties or the
court would remain able to raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time prior to trial or disposition on the merits. 41 A
42
timely objection in the trial court could be raised again on appeal,
and collusion between opposing parties would be grounds for dismissal at any time prior to final judgment. 43 Resolution of jurisdictional problems could be postponed pending further clarification of relevant facts or pending appellate review,44 and, finally, a
party unable to assert a timely objection would not be foreclosed
from raising it later.45 It is doubtful that the prospect of occasional

cases reaching judgment with known jurisdictional defects is a
sufficiently serious impediment to healthy federalism to justify the
excesses invited by the existing rule.
The ALI proposal, although aimed at sound judicial administration, takes inadequate account of the weeding function currently performed by the subject matter fetish. The principle that
jurisdictional matters should ordinarily be taken care of at the
outset of litigation is unquestionably valid.46 From the administrative point of view, however, there is no reason that this wisdom
must be petrified in a prohibition. The ALI proposal would require that cases in which lack of jurisdiction became apparent but
no exception applied be processed through to completion, no matter
what the cost in judicial resources. A better alternative would vest
the courts with discretion to dismiss. Used in a principled manner, such discretion would discourage dilatory tactics as effectively as
would a flat prohibition.
With respect to fairness to the parties, the ALI proposal greatly
improves upon current practice. No longer would a defendant be
encouraged to conceal a jurisdictional defect until the statute of
limitations had run and then render himself immune to the suit by
a tardy attack on the court's jurisdiction. The sole fairness ad4

0The abstention doctrine is an example of one such discretionary protection,
as opposed to a constitutional requirement such as the need for a federal cause of

action. See generally Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974).
41ALI SunyD, supra note 29, at § 1386(a).
42d. §
431d.

(a)((4).
§ 1386 (a) (3).

441d.

§ 1386(a) (1).

45Id. § 1386 (a) (2).
46 Z. Cn,-A-,
SOME PROBLEM~S

3386

oF EQurr 316-21 (1950).

ASSUMING JURISDICTION ARGUENDO

1979]

vantage of the existing rule would be preserved by the proposal's
exemption, previously mentioned, for situations in which the party
47
challenging jurisdiction was unable to do so in a timely fashion.
To one dogged critic of traditionally sanctimonious jurisdictional thinking, the ALI proposal errs by being too conservative, in
allowing jurisdictional defects to be raised at any time before a case
comes to trial.48 Although the selection of this cutoff point, rather
than an earlier one, may conceivably work unfairness to a party
engaged in lengthy pre-trial proceedings, the ALI proposal wisely
removes the greatest incentive and the most egregious harm by tolling the statute of limitations until thirty days after dismissal of
the original action on jurisdictional grounds.49 No system of procedures has yet been invented that renders unfairness impossible,
and whatever the ALI proposal lacks in that regard is arguably outweighed by the strong interest in policing the limits of federal court
jurisdiction.
Thus, none of the four policies identified as supporting the
current rule are sufficiently weighty to justify its rigidity. On the
contrary, principles of sound judicial administration and fairness
point to a modification that would allow federal courts a limited
discretion to ignore jurisdictional errors not raised in timely fashion.
Such a result should not be surprising in light of the established
policy of overlooking jurisdictional infirmities once final judgment
has been rendered. That policy will be discussed next, in the context of collateral attacks on jurisdictionally defective judgments.
B. Res Judicataand the Bootstrap Doctrine
At common law, judgments rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction over the subject matter were void and vulnerable to collateral attack. The modern view is largely opposite: as a rule, such
judgments will be enforced as valid," no matter whether the court
47ALI STtur,

supra note 29, at § 1386(a)(2).

48 Beyond Bootstrap, supra note 29, at 525-28.
49ALI STuDy, supra note 29, at § 1386(b), (c).
50 See generally Boskey & Braucher, Jurisdiction and CollateralAttack, October

Term, 1939, 40 CoLum. L. REv. 1006 (1940). Immunity from collateral attack for
subject matter jurisdictional defects had been conferred on federal court judgments
as early as Des Moines Nay. & R.R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U.S. 552, 557
(1887).

The traditional doctrine was not firmly displaced, however, until the

decisions in Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938), and Chicot County Drainage
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). Boskey and Braucher interpret
Stoll and Chicot County as suggesting that, with the exception of cases presenting

considerations which outweigh the policy against collateral attack, see, e.g., Kalb
v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940), "no special sanctity should attach to jurisdictional
limitations, deriving often from judicial convenience or mere historical accident."
Boskey & Braucher, supra, at 1010.
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merely overstepped the bounds of a valid statutory grant of jurisdiction, whether the jurisdictional statute is found unconstitutional,5 1
or whether the court violated article III limits on federal jurisdiction.52

The rule that jurisdictional determinations are res judicata is
founded on the overriding interest in the finality of judgments.
The policy of requiring an end to litigation is now recognized as
sufficiently strong to foreclose recourse to the argument that jurisdictional matters should be treated differently from substantive
issues because jurisdiction involves the court's "power" over a case.

3

Significantly, however, finality is not an absolute. In United States
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,5 4 a judgment based on an
improper waiver of sovereign immunity was held not to be res
judicata because the policy interests behind the sovereign immunity
doctrine were thought to outweigh the interest in repose. 55 In a
similar vein, the Restatement of Judgments lists a group of factors
to be weighed by a court when faced with a collateral attack on a
jurisdictionally defective judgment.56
Although the policy of finality is clear, the attempt to reconcile
it with the axiom that judgments issuing from a court lacking jurisdiction are void has created doctrinal difficulties. The prevailing
fiction, known as the "bootstrap" doctrine, 57 reasons that a court has
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, and, whether that
determination is correct or not, it is binding unless overturned on
appeal.5 8
The bootstrap doctrine has proved useful in contexts other than
collateral attack. In United States v. United Mine Workers,5 9 the
district court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order against
a proposed strike in mines that were under the control of the federal government. Rather than appeal the order, the union chose to
ignore it, apparently in the reasonable belief that the Norris51 Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
52

Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 325-26 (1928)

(no case or

controversy); Des Moines Nay. & R.R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U.S. 552
(1887) (lack of diversity). See Z. CMAXE', supra note 46, at 370-71.
53 See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78 (1939).

54309 U.S. 506 (1940).
65 Id. 514.
OF JuncmENTs § 10 (1942).
The term was apparently coined in Note, Res Judicata and Jurisdiction: The
Bootstrap Doctrine, 53 HLv. L. REv. 652 (1940).
66 RESTATEmrNT
57

58

See Beyond Bootstrap, supra note 29, at 496; Dobbs, The Validation of Void
Judgments: The Bootstrap Principle, 53 VA. L. REv. 1003, 1241 (1967). But see
Z. CHAFE, supra note 46, at 319 n.42.
59330 U.S. 258 (1947).
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LaGuardia Act of 1932 60 deprived the court of jurisdiction to enjoin a labor dispute. Contempt citations ensued and were upheld
by the Supreme Court. The majority opinion argued that the
district court did have jurisdiction despite the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, and alternatively, even if it did not have jurisdiction, the order
was valid and deserving of respect because a court has the power to
determine its own jurisdiction and to issue interim orders to preserve the status quo."1 The latter branch of the Court's holding
overturned established precedents that no duty existed to obey an
62
order issued by a court lacking jurisdiction.
United Mine Workers thus stands for the proposition that,
when confronted with novel and substantial jurisdictional questions,
a federal court has the power to issue temporary relief to preserve
the status quo while inquiring into its own jurisdiction.63 The
labor context of the case, however, suggests a broader reading. It
has long been recognized that ex parte restraining orders against
strikes, although "temporary" in name, in fact permanently dispose
of the merits by awarding the complaining party the desired relief
This phenomenon was a prominent
and mooting the dispute.
factor in the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which deprived
federal courts of jurisdiction to issue labor injunctions.6 5 Given
this history, it is somewhat coy to view United Mine Workers as
limiting bootstrap jurisdiction to orders maintaining the status quo.
In effect, the district court resolved the merits of the dispute without first having established its jurisdiction, and this procedure was
validated by the Supreme Court. If this reading of the case is
correct, then bootstrap jurisdiction arguably allows a court not
merely to preserve the status quo, but effectively to issue substantive
rulings as well. 66
6029 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
61330 U.S. at 289-95.
62
1n re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888); Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713 (1885).

But see United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906). See generally Cox, The Void
Order and the Duty to Obey, 16 U. CHE. L. REv. 86 (1948); Rendleman, More on
Void Orders, 7 GA. L. Rv. 246 (1973).
63 The precedential weight of that part of the opinion which held the order
valid even if the district court lacked jurisdiction is open to question.

Of the five

justices who so held, three also held that in fact the district court did have juris-

diction; for them, the rest was dictum. Only two members of the Court, Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson, firmly held that the district court's order was enforceable
even though the court lacked jurisdiction to issue it. See Z. CHEuF_, supra note 46,
at 365-67.
aNEnmn & N. GREENE, THE L.AoR INJUNcTiON 200-01 (1930).
64F. FR
65
See Z. CEL4.=, supra note 46, at 373.
66

See Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1964); 13 WhiGrH &
§ 3537.

M.mran, supra note 15, at
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The opinion in United Mine Workers, to the extent that it
offered any rationale, rested on grounds of necessity and the resulting judicial impotence if parties before the court were to be free to
ignore its orders.67 Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the judgment, provided more forceful justification, prophesying not only
reduced prestige of the courts, but also an end to "a government of
68
laws and not of men" if the contempt findings were not enforced.
These arguments of necessity do not explain how the courts
and American society managed to survive the long period when the
law held that lack of jurisdiction was a valid defense to a contempt
charge. Moreover, the majority and Justice Frankfurter both specifically excepted situations in which the jurisdictional issues purportedly being considered by the court were frivolous, an indication
that the perceived necessity was a relative one. 69 Nor, in the majority's view, was the necessity so great as to require enforcement of
civil, as opposed to criminal, contempt findings if the court lacked
jurisdiction. 70 What the Court paraded as necessity was in reality
a redefined notion of what is mandated by principles of sound
judicial administration. If policy indicates that respect for the
judicial process requires finality for erroneous jurisdictional as well
as substantive findings, there is no reason why orders of a court lacking jurisdiction cannot likewise be enforced, 71 whether those orders
are procedural or substantive in nature. Thus stripped of rhetoric,
United Mine Workers represents a balanced judgment that the
policy underlying the axiom of jurisdiction does not outweigh the
advantages to judicial administration of a duty to obey "void"
orders.
This brief survey demonstrates that "the mistaken notion that
there is something peculiarly brittle and theological about jurisdictional concepts" 72 has been significantly eroded by modern
67330 U.S. at 289-95.
68Id.

307 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).

69 Id.

293, 310.

70 Id. 294-95.
71 But just as in the field of res judicata the public interest in finality of
litigation led the courts to modify, and in large measure to abandon, the
distinction between jurisdictional infirmities and mere error, so . . . [with
"void" orders] the general public interest in vindicating the authority of
the courts and in encouraging the orderly conduct of litigation may well
justify judicial reconsideration of the same distinction.

Cox, supra note 62, at 115.
72
Gavit, supra note 26, at 543.
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trends. Today, with few exceptions,7 3 a judgment is res judicata,
even if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. Interim orders are enforceable in certain circumstances
despite jurisdictional infirmities. Furthermore, a cogent attack has
been mounted on the rule that lack of subject matter jurisdiction
may be raised at any time prior to final judgment and must be
noticed by the court. In each of these contexts, the requirements
of sound judicial administration are thought to outweigh the substance of the inherited dogma that actions by a court taken beyond
its jurisdiction are void. Although these developments have created
doctrinal difficulties as yet unresolved, it seems safe to say that the
validity of additional modifications depends upon the relative weight
of the policies supporting them.
Before proceeding to an examination of the policies favoring
the use of hypothetical jurisdiction, the reduced role of the jurisdictional axiom will be further explored by outlining related developments in ancillary and pendent jurisdiction.
C. Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction
Federal subject matter jurisdiction has long been considered
flexible enough to encompass claims of parties and proceedings
supplemental or ancillary to the main action 74 and dependent nonfederal claims involving the original parties. 7 5 In both situations
the federal court asserts jurisdiction over claims that, but for their
intimate relation to subject matter properly before the court, would
lie outside the article III sphere of power. The modern trend has
been to expand the closely related doctrines of ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction to further the sound administration of the federal judi76
cial system.
As conceived, ancillary jurisdiction was considered necessary
to the ability of a federal court to decide the case before it." In
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,78 this rationale was expanded.
In that case, plaintiff sued on a federal antitrust statute; defendant's
73See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 114 n.12 (1963); In re Green, 369 U.S.
689 (1962); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506

(1940).
74

Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
76 See Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent lurisdiction, 33 U. Prr. L. BEV. 759 (1972).
77
Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860); see 13 WRaHT &
Mm.,Em, supranote 15, at § 3523.
78270 U.S. 593 (1926).
75
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compulsory counterclaim requested an injunction. The Court rejected the plaintiff's antitrust argument and could have dismissed
the counterclaim, as there was neither diversity between the parties
nor any other independent basis for federal jurisdiction. The Court
chose to grant the injunction, however, noting that dismissal would
"rob . . . of all serviceable meaning" the rule that counterclaims

arising out of the same transaction must be pleaded. 79 Thus, the
case has been interpreted as making procedural convenience an adequate justification for extending federal judicial power beyond explicit congressional grants of jurisdiction under article III.80
The Supreme Court has not delimited the outer bounds of
ancillary jurisdiction; however, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 8' a
case addressing pendent jurisdictional issues, has been perceived as
expanding the scope of both doctrines.8 2 To the Gibbs Court,
pendent jurisdiction, traditionally limited to joinder of state and
federal claims involving the same parties, was grounded in a broadened constitutional definition of "case." State and federal claims
constitute a single case under article III if they "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" and if a plaintiff would "ordinarily
be expected to try them" in one proceeding.8 Judicial power to
take pendent jurisdiction was sharply distinguished from the exercise of that power, which is a matter for the court's discretion,
to be governed by considerations of judicial economy, procedural
convenience, and fairness to the parties.84
The Court did not attempt to justify the generous notion of
a constitutional "case" it employed. Although the opinion duly
paid lip service to the credo that adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure did not enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal
courts,85 it is likely that the same considerations of judicial economy,
fairness, and convenience embodied in the Rules were at play in
expanding the constitutional definition of "case." 86 The Court's
final standard for ascertaining judicial power to exercise pendent
jurisdiction makes this conclusion nearly inescapable: "But if . . .
79Id. 610.
See Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a
Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1263, 1267 (1975).
80 13 WwGsHT & MmTx.En, supra note 15, at § 3523; see Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397, 405, 425 (1970).
81383 U.S. 715 (1966).

82

See, e.g., Baker, supra note 76, at 763; Comment, supra note 79, at 1271.

83 383 U.S. at 725.
84 Id. 726.
85 Id. 725 n.13.
86 See generally Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REv. 395 (1976).
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a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to
try them all in one judicial proceeding, then... there is power in
federal courts to hear the whole." 87 After several decades of practice under the Rules, their spirit and policy necessarily permeate
"ordinary expectations" of what claims would be tried in one court
action.88 It is therefore not unreasonable to conclude that the principles operative in extending federal jurisdiction to pendent claims
are the same policy considerations that underlie ancillary jurisdiction and justify departure from the rule that, strictly speaking, a
court has no power to decide a claim over which it has no independent jurisdictional power.
This is not to say that only considerations of efficiency and
convenience shall determine a court's jurisdiction over the pendent
claim. There must still be a "common nucleus of operative fact."
Additionally, there may be statutory limits on the court's power to
hear pendent claims.8 9 But neither of these strictures detracts from
the thesis that, as with res judicata, the bootstrap doctrine, and
ancillary jurisdiction, principles of sound judicial administration
dilute the strength of the jurisdictional axiom and allow federal
courts to entertain and decide claims over which they have no independent basis of jurisdiction.
II.

HYPOTHETICAL JURISDICTION:

POWER TO ASSUME

JURISDICTION ARGUEN]o

The fundamental question concerning hypothetical jurisdiction
is one of judicial power: is it ever permissible for a federal court 90
to assume jurisdiction arguendo and decide a case on its merits?
87383 U.S. at 725. Federal power is also contingent on the substantiality of
the federal issue. Id.
88 See Baker, supra note 76, at 765.
89 See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).

Accord, Owen Equip. &

Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). Although limited by the facts and
the Court's careful limitation to the context of pendent parties, 427 U.S. at 17-18
n.12, the reasoning in Aldinger has been read by one commentator as implicitly
extending to ordinary pendent jurisdiction as well. Comment, Aldinger v. Howard

and Pendent Jurisdiction,77 COLum. L. Rxv. 127, 148 (1977).

90 In general, this Comment will ignore differences in the appropriateness of
hypothetical jurisdiction as applied by district courts, courts of appeals, and the
Supreme Court. Some of the policies set out below as supporting the validity of
hypothetical jurisdiction, such as the policy of avoiding constitutional adjudication,
will apply equally to all federal courts while others will not: the algebra of judicial
economy will vary with the procedural posture and history of a case. It would be
premature to attempt in this Comment to catalogue the innumerable possible
permutations or to assess their significance for hypothetical jurisdiction. When
See notes 113 &
appropriate, notice of relevant differences has been taken.

172 infra.
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This inquiry is preliminary to that focusing on the limits of the
discretionary use of hypothetical jurisdiction, which is postponed
until Part III. Here only the question of power is addressed. 1
It should be noted that the discussion in Part I of various reforms in modern jurisdictional thinking has not preordained the
result. Unlike the ALI proposal,92 hypothetical jurisdiction does
not concern the timeliness of judisdictional challenges; it applies
as well to the timely and fully litigated issue as to the tardy. Nor
does it invoke the policy of repose that operates once final judgments have been rendered,93 or of respect for the courts that supports the duty to obey interim orders.94 Moreover, unlike ancillary
or pendent jurisdiction, 5 with hypothetical jurisdiction there is no
federal claim or action that creates an indisputable ground for
federal jurisdiction. Although hypothetical jurisdiction may draw
strength from these concepts by force of analogy, it must ultimately
establish its own title to judicial power.
Judicial power to exercise hypothetical jurisdiction as used in
this Comment is predicated upon two basic conditions. First, the
jurisdictional point that is to be assumed arguendo must be difficult
and far-reaching; no claim is made for power to avoid jurisdictional
issues that are clearly frivolous or insubstantial, or even routine.9 6
Second, the question on the merits must be decided against the party
91 Questions of judicial power are only relevant, of course, if hypothetical jurisdiction actually occurs. An argument that it does not might build on the writings
of Professor Chafee, who ventured the opinion, in the context of a discussion of
equity jurisdiction, that much of what passes as jurisdictional actually concerns rules
of right decision and does not go to the court's power. Z. CHAEEE, supra note 46,
at 296-363. His twin policies of the Bright Line and First Things First (respectively,
the boundary between judicial power and nullity, and confining defects in power
to issues able to be ascertained preliminarily), applied to hypothetical jurisdiction
cases, might show that the questions bypassed were not at bottom questions of the
court's power, but rather questions of how the court ought to exercise that powerthat is, questions on the merits. A court that chose to decide a case on its substantive merits, rather than confront the "jurisdictional merits," would simply be
disposing of a case decidedly within its power on an alternative ground.
Although based on sound policy, this approach is rejected here because it does
not comport with the courts' perceptions of the nature of the jurisdictional issues
being avoided in hypothetical jurisdiction cases. See, e.g., Moor v. County of
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715 (1973); Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 954 n.7 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
92 See text accompanying notes 34-48 supra.
93 See text accompanying notes 50-58 supra.
94 See text accompanying notes 59-71 supra.
95 See text accompanying notes 74-89 supra.
96 No attempt is made to define "difficult" or "far-reaching," whose meaning can
only be captured on a case-by-case basis. In other contexts, however, the existence
of judicial power hangs upon the equally indefinable standard of substantiality. See
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947).
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invoking the court's jurisdiction; if the complaining party is entitled to relief, then hypothetical jurisdiction is inappropriate. 97 In
the following analysis of judicial power, the satisfaction of these
conditions will be assumed.
The major doctrinal barrier to the validity of hypothetical
jurisdiction thus defined is the federal court's duty to inquire into
its own and a lower court's jurisdiction and to dismiss the case if
jurisdiction is found wanting.9 s If this duty is absolute and admits
of no exceptions, then hypothetical jurisdiction must fail.
One major purpose of imposing this duty on a court is obvious:
it exists in order to ensure that federal courts do not stray beyond
the limits on their power and fall into jurisdictional error. However, no sooner is this function of the duty identified than an exception can be made out. For when the gravity of jurisdictional error
is slight, it is only reasonable that the duty to make jurisdictional
findings is attenuated.
In a routine case in which the court's jurisdiction is a straightforward affair, the gravity of a jurisdictional error will be great: a
court that takes jurisdiction over a case far beyond its legitimate
reach is guilty of a serious violation of the limits on federal court
jurisdiction. In the typical hypothetical jurisdiction case, however,
the jurisdictional issue is a difficult one with far-reaching consequences. In a close case, in which the jurisdictional point could
reasonably be resolved either way, the gravity of any potential
jurisdictional error is significantly reduced, and the duty compelling
the court to make a jurisdictional ruling appears in a new light.
It no longer serves as a vehicle for policing the established boundaries of federal jurisdiction, but rather imposes a stiff regimen on the
essentially creative process of testing and probing jurisdictional concepts at the frontiers of jurisdiction. In this context, the policy of
avoiding jurisdictional error has diminished strength, and courts
have quite reasonably taken competing policies into account.
Avoidance of unnecessary constitutional adjudication, conservation
of judicial energies, and considerations of sound judicial administration-policies developed more fully below 9 9-may singly or in
combination justify an exception to the court's duty to establish
its jurisdiction before reaching the merits. 100
9 The rationale for this condition is explored below. See text accompanying
notes 129-38 infra.
9
s See note 17 supra & accompanying text.
99 See text accompanying notes 106-16 infra.
100 This functional approach to the scope of the court's duty to decide its jurisdiction finds support in Beyond Bootstrap, supra note 29, at 507-24. Professor
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A second justification for imposing an absolute duty on federal
courts to establish their jurisdiction might be thought to derive
from Chief Justice Marshall's famous statement that the Court has
"no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given,
than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would
be treason to the constitution." 11 A strict constitutional duty to
decide a case once jurisdiction is given might be taken as requiring
an equally strict antecedent duty to decide in every case whether
jurisdiction does in fact exist.
The debate over the courts' duty to decide cases within their
jurisdiction and the related virtues and vices of avoidance has been
acute,'0 2 but in assessing the relevance of that discussion to the
validity of hypothetical jurisdiction it is important to note a crucial
difference: whereas the debate over decision and avoidance focuses
on the use of jurisdictional devices to avoid judgment on the merits,
hypothetical jurisdiction authorizes judgment on the merits as a
method of avoiding knotty jurisdictional matters.
To the extent that the judicial duty to decide a case on its
merits derives from the duty to render substantive justice in the dispute between the parties, that duty is satisfied when the court enters
judgment on the merits and avoids only the jurisdictional issue.
Jurisdictional matters, more than substantive law, are peculiarly the
province of the court, and the parties have only a derivative interest
in them. Decisions on difficult jurisdictional questions are likely
to have far-reaching consequences, as they are inevitably cast in
Dobbs' review of the case law widely thought of as supporting the traditional rule
that subject matter jurisdictional issues can be raised at any time concludes that the
actual rule contained in the holdings is a narrower one, limiting tardy jurisdictional
attacks to cases in which lack of jurisdiction appears affirmatively from the record.
Although his focus is on the tardy jurisdictional challenge, whereas hypothetical
jurisdiction applies equally to jurisdictional contentions made in timely fashion,
Dobbs' study corroborates the view that the court's duty originated in a concern over
avoiding obvious jurisdictional error. Once the duty is so described, it can no longer
be treated as absolute, and the door is open to consideration of competing values.
See generally Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115 (1898); Hartog v. Memory, 116
U.S. 588 (1886).
Dobbs accordingly adopts a narrow interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(h)(3), which provides: "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action." FED. R. Cr. P. 12(h) (3). In Dobbs' view, the federal
rule, meant to codify the case law, goes no further than his revisionist reading of
the cases. Beyond Bootstrap, supra note 29, at 519.
10 1 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
02
1
See Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 HAny. L. Rsv. 40 (1961); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CoLum. L. REv.
1 (1964); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAnv.
L. REv. 1 (1959).
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general terms and are seldom easily confined to specific factual situations. The continuing vitality of the jurisdictional fetish-the inability of the parties to waive lack of subject matter jurisdictionserves as a reminder that jurisdiction historically has been the special
ward of the court, too highly valued to be entrusted to the parties.
Moreover, whatever interest the parties have in a finding of
subject matter jurisdiction is extinguished by the court's dismissal
on the merits. 10 3 This was recognized by the Supreme Court in one
hypothetical jurisdiction case when it expressed its unwillingness to
decide the jurisdictional question by observing that "even the most
diligent and zealous advocate could find his ardor somewhat dampened in arguing a jurisdictional issue where the decision on the
merits is thus foreordained." 14
This assimilation of the rationale behind hypothetical jurisdiction to what Professor Bickel described as "passive virtues" 105 might
be resisted on the ground that those avoidance techniques may only
be justified by the imperative that courts perform in principled
fashion their paramount duty to interpret substantive law. From
this contrary perspective, hypothetical jurisdiction appears to be
more an "active vice" than a "passive virtue": it permits courts to
reach the merits of a case without making certain they have jurisdiction to do so. Such a practice cannot be validated by reference to
the necessity that courts engage in principled adjudication of the
merits.
Plainly, jurisdictional questions also have their "merits." The
necessity for principled decision of complex jurisdictional matters is
not inferior to that of substantive questions. It might even be
argued that, insofar as they regulate access to the courts, jurisdictional decisions are in the long run of greater jurisprudential
significance.
Thus, the notion that a court has an absolute duty affirmatively
to establish its jurisdiction in every case neither can be located in
the tradition based on the policy of avoiding jurisdictional error nor
be derived from a constitutional duty to decide cases within the
court's jurisdiction. Moreover, significant policies are furthered by
acknowledging judicial power to assume jurisdiction arguendo. In
103 Hypothetical jurisdiction, by definition, only applies to cases in which the
court finds against the party asserting jurisdiction. See text accompanying notes
129-38 infra and 97 supra. The party challenging jurisdiction would have no interest
in raising jurisdictional issues once the case had been decided in his favor on the
merits.
104 Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676, 678 (1974).
105 Bickel, supra note 102.
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any given case these policies may overlap, but they are sufficiently
distinct to be articulated separately.
The first policy is the familiar one of avoiding constitutional
rulings unless they are absolutely or "strictly" necessary to the disposition of the case. 10 6 The "great gravity and delicacy" 107 of constitutional adjudication, which compels judicial restraint, is perhaps
most acute when the constitutional question concerns self-imposed
or congressionally mandated limits on federal court jurisdiction, for
it is here that the role of the federal judiciary in the constitutional
separation of powers is most directly confronted.
A second consideration is the conservation of judicial energies.
The "explosion" of federal litigation has been much noted, and
various reforms of a structural nature have been proposed.,0 Procedural adjustments have also been required, and further changes
will no doubt be essential in the foreseeable future. 0 9 From an
administrative standpoint, substantial savings in judicial resources
can be achieved by allowing courts to skirt complex and timeconsuming jurisdictional arguments when the questions on the
merits are more simply resolved." 0 Those jurisdictional issues, and
106Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947); Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Constitutional matters may be implicated in jurisdictional questions in any number
of ways. The constitutionality of a jurisdictional statute may be in question, or
alternatively, its interpretation may impinge on constitutional concerns. Distinct from
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, constitutional and statutory, are the jurisdictional questions deriving from the case or controversy requirement of article III,
such as standing, ripeness, mootness, and administrative questions. Extra-statutory
forms of jurisdiction such as ancillary and pendent jurisdiction must also conform to
constitutional limitations.
107 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 544
(1923)). Applying the Ashwander doctrine to issues of subject matter jurisdiction
works an extension of the principles enumerated by Justice Brandeis for dealing with
the merits of cases "confessedly within" the Court's jurisdiction. Among the situations he noted, however, were several involving the case or controversy requirement,
normally considered jurisdictional. Gunther, supra note 102, at 17. See also Rescue
Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 n.37 (1947). The Court has itself
extended the doctrine to issues of subject matter jurisdiction. Neese v. Southern
Ry., 350 U.S. 77 (1955); see Grmnenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156 (1968).
10
8 See generally H. FAmiNLY, FtnnL JuLuSDCnON: A GEmmi.. VIEw
(1973); 13 WRcrG
109

& MILLER, supra note 15, at § 3510.

Leventhal, Appellate Procedures: Design, Patchwork, and Managed Flexibility, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 432 (1976).
110 Although the question apparently has never arisen, the value of promoting
judicial economy would obviously require that judgments reached by means of
hypothetical jurisdiction be considered res judicata.
In Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938), the Court rested its finding that a
jurisdictionally defective judgment was res judicata
on the fact that in an actual controversy the question of the jurisdiction
over the subject matter was raised and determined adversely to the
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the resources necessary to decide them, are better allocated to cases
in which the substantive issues do not render the jurisdictional issues
merely theoretical.
A third policy, half jurisprudential and half administrative,
looks not to the quantity of the judicial input, but to the quality
of the product. The responsibility for the bulk of the basic decisionmaking concerning federal jurisdiction belongs, in the first instance,
to Congress; however, statutory grants must be interpreted and the
Constitution observed. In addition, the federal courts have traditionally exercised certain forms of extra-statutory jurisdiction, such
as ancillary and pendent jurisdiction."1 If this shared responsibility
to administer access to the federal judicial system is to be discharged
effectively, then the courts, under the pressure of ever-growing
dockets, must be allowed some flexibility in deciding when to decide
complex jurisdictional issues. It is not beyond reason to suggest
that clear and rational resolution of jurisdictional controversies has
been hindered by the traditional requirement that they be adjudicated in every case in which they arise. 112 Relief from this necessity
may result in more thoughtful handling of jurisdictional problems,
and thereby lead to a simplification of jurisdictional doctrines." 3
respondent. That determination is res adjudicata of that issue in this
action, whether or not power to deal with the particular subject matter was
strictly or quasi-jurisdictional.
Id. 177. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940),
implicitly extended that doctrine to a jurisdictional issue the parties could have raised
and had finally determined in the original proceeding, but did not. Id. 378. Both
cases emphasize the actual or possible determination of the lower court in the
original action. The question posed by hypothetical jurisdiction is whether a
judgment can be res judicata when the jurisdictional issue was raised in the earlier
proceeding but the court expressly chose not to decide it.
Clearly a determination that is never made cannot itself be res judicata, because
nothing has been adjudicated. The jurisdictional issue bypassed by means of hypothetical jurisdiction is therefore not res judicata. But it does not follow from this
that the judgment on the merits must fall to collateral attack.
The essential meaning of Stoll and Chicot County is that jurisdictional precepts
should enjoy no "special sanctity." See note 50 supra. The same considerations of
policy which affirm the practice by which federal courts avoid jurisdictional questions
and decide on the merits should be applied in the context of collateral attack.
Together with the additional strong interest in finality, these policy considerations
surely outweigh any argument propounding the immortality of jurisdictional defects.
"'1 See text accompanying notes 74-89 supra.
12
1
See Bickel, supra note 102, at 47. Lack of adverseness may in some circumstances interfere with a court's ability properly to decide jurisdictional questions.
See text accompanying note 104 supra. A factor commonly cited by courts as
contributing to the decision to avoid the jurisdictional issues is inadequacy in the
record, briefing, or argument. See, e.g., Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S.
676, 677 (1974); Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 88 (1970); Mitchell v.
West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 507 F.2d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir. 1975).
118 The Supreme Court, of course, already enjoys wide discretion in deciding
which cases to hear. In one hypothetical jurisdiction case, however, review was
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Apart from the quality of jurisdictional decisions, when made,
it may sometimes be a valuable alternative not to find either jurisdiction or the lack of it, but to leave the issue undecided. 14 When
an appellate court is confronted with large issues such as expanding
federal court review of court-martial convictions 115 or the validity
of pendent party jurisdiction,11 6 resolution of the jurisdictional questions may be too hasty and clumsy, whereas dismissal on the merits
may send a more finely-tuned signal to the lower courts. Because it
is responsible for regulating traffic in the federal judicial system, an
appellate court may need to observe traffic conditions on a new
avenue before responding to demands for particular signals.
Viewed functionally, federal jurisdiction represents the division
of judicial labor as mandated by the Constitution and Congress and
interpreted by the courts. 117 The jurisdictional axiom that courts
are powerless to act without jurisdiction over the subject matter is,
as a general rule, essential to rational judicial management. However, when it appears that blind adherence to that rule or its various
corollaries is wasteful or conflicts with important policies, sound
principles of judicial administration require that it give way. Hypothetical jurisdiction, like res judicata, the bootstrap doctrine, and
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, can be another exception to the
jurisdictional axiom that will promote the efficient and sensible
management of the federal business of dispensing justice.
III.

HYPOTHETICAL JURISDICTION: GUIDELINES FOR DISCRETION

In Part II, policy considerations were found to support the
existence of judicial power to assume jurisdiction arguendo. Formulation of guidelines for the discretionary exercise of hypothetical
jurisdiction can best be undertaken by reviewing the case law.
Hypothetical jurisdiction can be viewed in terms of a continuum
over which the justifiability of its use varies inversely with the difficulty and magnitude of the issues on the merits.
The complexity of the
obligatory. Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976).
jurisdictional issue or the unavailability of alternative grounds of decision may not

appear until after review has been granted. Thus, in two cases the jurisdictional
issue was the subject of the petition for writ of certiorari, but the Court dismissed
on the merits. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 351-52 (1969); Neese
v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S. 77 (1955).
4

11 See Bickel, supra note 102, at 50-51.
115 See Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974); United States v.
Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
116 See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
117 See note 30 supra.
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A. The Easy Case
The easy hypothetical jurisdiction case is one in which the
jurisdictional issues are weighty and complex, and favorable disposition of plaintiff's claims on the merits is foreclosed by sound
precedent. That was the situation in Secretary of the Navy v.
Avrech 118 and Norton v. Mathews."19 In Avrech, the jurisdictional
question concerned the power of a district court to review convictions of courts-martial in the context of a suit in which the relief
sought was a declaratory judgment, back pay, and expunction of
records. On the merits, the plaintiff argued that a provision of the
military justice code was unconstitutionally vague, a contention that
the Court had rejected in a case decided only a few weeks before. 2 0
Norton v. Mathews came to the Court on appeal from the
decision of a three-judge court upholding the constitutionality of a
provision of the Social Security Act. 12 ' In a companion case, 22 the
substantive issues had been decided against the plaintiff. The
Norton Court affirmed the decision below, stating that the decision
in the companion case rendered the substantive question "a decided
issue and thus one no longer substantial in the jurisdictional
sense." 123 This was a reference to the much-questioned doctrine
that federal courts have no jurisdiction over federal questions that
are "frivolous" or "wholly insubstantial," 124 a criterion that is met
25
if Supreme Court precedent is directly controlling.
Although it might be argued that Norton and Avrech should
be viewed not as turning on the merits, but rather as dismissing on
an alternative jurisdictional ground, such an approach does little to
further analysis of the phenomenon in question. The idea that dismissal for lack of a substantial federal question is a jurisdictional
ruling rather than a decision on the merits is ill-conceived, and has
118418 U.S. 676 (1974).

See also Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975);
119427 U.S. 524 (1976).
Franklin Savings Bank v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 527-28 (2d Cir. 1977); Smith v.
Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 450 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D.
Pa. 1978). Cf. McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21, 32 (1975) (court did not
reach issue of substantiality of claim, as plaintiff conceded that its insubstantiality
required dismissal).
120 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
12142 U.S.C. §§ 402(d) (3), 416(h)(3)(c)(ii) (1976).
12 2 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
123 Id. 530-31.
124 Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
682-83 (1946).
125 Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933).
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Its conbeen roundly criticized, even as it has been reiterated.12
tinuing vitality as a doctrine appears to derive from its usefulness in
the context of pendent jurisdiction, where it serves to discourage
the use of frivolous federal claims as pretexts for bringing pendent
127
claims into federal court.
To exclude Avrech, Norton, and like cases from the sphere of
hypothetical jurisdiction only undercuts understanding; these cases
are better conceptualized as falling at the easy end of the hypothetical jurisdiction continuum. When the merits of a case cannot be
considered due to identity with an unquestionably valid Supreme
Court precedent, no purpose can be served by laboring over difficult
jurisdictional questions. Not surprisingly, this "easy case" variety of
hypothetical jurisdiction has enjoyed the widest use.
A closely related permutation has been employed in cases involving multiple parties and in consolidated cases in which jurisdiction is in question only as to one party but the merits are indistinguishable as to all.' 28 Rather than rule on the jurisdictional

issue, the Court has found it convenient to dispose of such cases on
the merits, on the ground that it was reaching the merits anyway
with respect to the party or parties over whom jurisdiction was uncontested. In such cases, the particular procedural posture of the
parties is unimportant; what matters is that the merits are identical
and render the jurisdictional dissimilarity irrelevant.
B. The Logical Limits of Hypothetical Jurisdiction
In Philbrook v. Glodgett,2 9 an identity of substantive issues
rendered the jurisdictional issue irrelevant, but the decision on the
merits went in the plaintiffs' favor. If Glodgett is a hypothetical
jurisdiction case, then hypothetical jurisdiction may be used not
only to dismiss on the merits, but also to grant the requested
relief.3 0
The defendants in Glodgett-Vermont's commissioner of welfare and the Secretary of the United States Department of Health,
126 Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 538 (1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397, 404-05 (1970).
12 7 See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946).
128 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.
59, 72 n.16 (1978). See Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386,
389 n.1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1976); Bipon Soc'y, Inc. v. National
Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933
(1976).
129 421 U.S. 707 (1975).
130 See text accompanying note 97 supra.
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Education, and Welfare-had agreed on a statutory interpretation
that deprived the plaintiffs of welfare benefits to which they believed
themselves entitled. A three-judge court found jurisdiction over
the state commissioner under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and over the
Secretary under principles of pendent party jurisdiction. 131 The
plaintiffs' interpretation of the statute was upheld; on appeal to the
Supreme Court the Secretary contested the lower court's assertion
of jurisdiction over him. Affirming on the merits, the Court dismissed the Secretary's jurisdictional appeal without deciding the
complex question of pendent party jurisdiction. 132
Less than a model of lucidity, the Court's reasoning on the
jurisdictional question proceeded as follows: the Secretary, instead
of complying with the Court's rules and adequately briefing the
jurisdictional issue, had argued simply that the jurisdictional issue
need not be decided-if the Court were to agree with the
plaintiffs on the merits, he would comply voluntarily with its
decision. 33 Noting that failure to comply with its rules would
ordinarily allow dismissal of the Secretary's appeal, the Court recognized that neither that rule nor the Secretary's "consent" to the
Court's interpretation could dispose of the problem whether subject
matter jurisdiction existed over the claim against the Secretary, a
question that the Court, as a rule, is obliged to notice on its own
motion, whether or not raised or waived by the parties. 34 In this
case, however, the Court found an exception to its duty to inquire
into the jurisdiction of the district court: because the merits were
indistinguishable as to both defendants and jurisdiction over the
state commissioner was unquestioned, it would be necesssary for
the Court to reach the merits anyway. Given the Secretary's willingness to cooperate and his failure properly to appeal in accordance
with the Court's rules, the Court saw no harm in dismissing his
appeal:
The exercise of the District Court's jurisdiction over the
Secretary in this case, therefore, has resulted in no adjudication on the merits that could not have been just as
properly made without the Secretary, and has resulted in
no issuance of process against the Secretary which he has
properly contended to be wrongful before this Court. 3 5
131 421 U.S. at 712, 720.
132 Id.

720-22.

'33 Id. 722.
34

1 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
135 421 U.S. at 722.
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The reference to "issuance of process" suggests that the Court's
opinion turned on the ambiguity whether pendent party jurisdiction presents a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter or
over the person. Ordinarily, when the pendent claim is not identical with the "federal" claim and is against the same party, there is
no doubt but that jurisdiction over the pendent claim is classifiable
as subject matter jurisdiction. But, the Court seemed to say, when
the pendent claim is identical to the "federal" claim and impleads a
new party, the jurisdictional question can be classified as one of
jurisdiction over the person. As such, it may be waived, and the
Court has no duty to decide it.
If this reading of the Court's opinion is accepted, then Philbrook v. Glodgett is not a hypothetical jurisdiction case because, in
the final analysis, the jurisdictional issue was not of the sort that
federal courts have a duty to resolve. 136 A contrary interpretation
would manifest an unexplained expansion of hypothetical jurisdiction. While all other hypothetical jurisdiction cases have been
decided on the merits against the party asserting jurisdiction, Glodgett was decided in that party's favor. Such an interpretation would
violate the logic of hypothetical jurisdiction, which may be stated
as follows: in order for the plaintiff to recover, he must prove both
(A) that the court has jurisdiction, and (B) that his claim is one
6

Two other cases which should not be confused with hypothetical jurisdiction
are Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) and Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978). In Schneckloth, cited in Secretary of the
Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676, 678 (1974), as support for arguendo assumption of
jurisdiction, the state's argument that the exclusionary rule should not afford a basis
for collateral attack in a habeas corpus proceeding was dismissed by the Court with
the sentence: "Since we have found no valid Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
claim in this case, we do not consider that question." 412 U.S. at 249 n.38. However, the state's argument actually went to the merits of habeas corpus review, and
was jurisdictional only in the exploded, old-fashioned sense in which courts had at
one time discussed such review-in terms of procedural defects that had deprived
the original trial court of "jurisdiction," thereby rendering the court's judgment void.
See Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 383
(1964). Thus in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), in which the argument
proposed by the state in Schneckloth eventually prevailed, the Court was careful to
note that the jurisdiction of federal courts over habeas corpus petitions alleging
fourth amendment violations was undisturbed by its ruling. Id. 494-95 n.37.
In Bakke, Justice Powelrs opinion announcing the judgment of the Court
assumed without deciding the existence of a private right of action under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). 98 S.Ct. at 2745.
The bypassed issue went neither to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction nor to
Bakke's standing, but only to the capacity of a private party to sue under Title VI.
Unlike standing, capacity to sue is waivable. See Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n,
330 U.S. 127, 134 (1947). Even Justice White, the only member of the Court to
object to Justice Powell's assumption, seemed to believe that a decision on what he
considered to be a "threshold jurisdictional issue" was not so much "obligatory" as
it was "advisable." Id. 2794 (White, J.) (separate opinion). As a waivable requirement, capacity to sue, like personal jurisdiction, is not the sort of jurisdictional
dictate with which hypothetical jurisdiction is concerned.
3.
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deserving of relief on the merits. If either A or B is false, then the
plaintiff must lose. Hypothetical jurisdiction, simply put, is the
recognition that, logically, if B is shown to be false, then the conjunction of A and B is necessarily false. The truth or falsity of A,
in this case, becomes irrelevant.
Suppose, however, that B is true; that is, that the claim is one
deserving of relief on the merits. Then the truth or falsity of A
must be determined: if A is true (that is, if jurisdiction exists), the
plaintiff wins; if false, he loses. To award relief without deciding
the jurisdictional issue in this situation is to discard the jurisdictional requirement altogether; recovery would no longer be dependent on the truth of both A and B, but on B alone. Hypothetical jurisdiction should not be confused with this latter situation. It
is not used to erase jurisdictional requirements and grant otherwise
unavailable relief. In a hypothetical jurisdiction case, jurisdiction
is assumed for the purpose of argument and relief is denied on the
merits. The requirement of jurisdiction is not discarded; it is still
in force, only it need not be confronted because it can have no
bearing on the ultimate disposition of the case.
It is this simple logic to which most courts appeal when they
defend their assumption of jurisdiction by observing that the result
will be the same however the jurisdictional knot is untied. 37
This common sense "same result" approach, of course, ignores the
traditional view of jurisdiction as a higher order affair, without
which a court has no power whatever to reach the merits, whether
ultimately decided for or against the plaintiff. 138 Indeed, the "same
result" approach proves too much, for it would generally allow
courts to ignore jurisdictional requirements except when a decision
in favor of the plaintiff was contemplated. By focusing solely on
the effect on the parties, this approach ignores the important role
that decisions, favorable and unfavorable, play in interpreting and
declaring substantive law. Nevertheless, the logic of the "same result" approach does serve to mark the outer limits of hypothetical
jurisdiction, which by definition can never be exercised unless the
merits are against the party asserting jurisdiction.
C. Cases of IntermediateDifficulty
Between the easy case in which a finding on the merits in favor
of the party asserting jurisdiction is foreclosed by precedent and
137 Slocum v. United States, 515 F.2d 237, 238 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975); Mitchell v.
West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 507 F.2d 662, 667 (5th Cir. 1975); Finch v.
Weinberger, 407 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
188 See The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).
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the outer limits bounded by the Glodgett result of deciding in that
party's favor lies a broad range of cases utilizing hypothetical jurisdiction. Only slightly more difficult than the easy cases are those
in which the jurisdictional issue is constitutional and the merits
present the question whether the lower court abused its discretion.
In Neese v. Southern Railway,13 9 in which only the jurisdictional
question was presented by the petition for certiorari, the Court
avoided the certified issue and upheld the lower court's use of discretion on the merits. The Court explicitly applied its policy of
following "the traditional practice of this Court of refusing to decide constitutional questions when the record discloses other grounds
of decision, whether or not they have been properly raised before
us by the parties." 140 Similarly, in Moor v. County of Alameda,141
the Court dodged the issue of the existence of article III power to
assert pendent party jurisdiction over a county in an action brought
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,142 finding that,
whether or not the lower court had such power, it acted within
its discretion in dismissing the pendent claims. 4 3
United States v. Augenblick, 4 4 cited more frequently than any
other case as authority for the application of hypothetical jurisdiction, cannot be assimilated to these easy and relatively easy cases.
In separate proceedings, the Court of Claims had awarded back pay
to two servicemen, finding their court-martial convictions constitutionally defective and hence invalid. The petitions for writs of
certiorari were granted because of the importance of the jurisdictional question of the Court of Claims' power to review court-martial
convictions for constitutional shortcomings in the context of backpay suits.145 Although the Court of Claims had long exercised that
jurisdiction, the Government contended that changes in the applicable law had deprived the lower court of jurisdiction. On the
merits, the respondents argued that various evidentiary irregularities
at their courts-martial had deprived them of fair trials in violation
of the Constitution.
139350 U.S. 77 (1955).

140 Id. 78 (citations omitted). See also Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393
U.S. 156, 157-58 (1968), in which the Supreme Court bypassed a seventh amendment challenge to appellate jurisdiction to reach the merits of a tort claim.
141 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
14242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
14 8Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976), took up the question left open in
Moor and held that pendent party jurisdiction had been impliedly negated by
Congress in the circumstances of that case.
144393 U.S. 348 (1969).
145 Id. 349.
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In his opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice Douglas avoided
the jurisdictional problem in a single sentence, concluding that
"even if we assume, arguendo, that a collateral attack on a courtmartial judgment may be made in the Court of Claims through a
back-pay suit alleging a 'constitutional' defect in the military decision, these present cases on their facts do not rise to that level." 146
Because Justice Douglas did not offer any justification for this procedure, the interpreter is necessarily left to his own devices to de7
cipher it.14

On its face, Augenblick presented a jurisdictional problem of a
statutory nature and merits of constitutional dimension, and was
therefore an unlikely candidate for hypothetical jurisdiction. Lurking in the background of the jurisdictional challenge, however, were
difficult and far-reaching constitutional issues concerning the proper
relationship between "non-constitutional" courts-martial established
pursuant to article I and "constitutional" article III courts. 148

The

magnitude of the jurisdictional problem appears even greater when
one ponders the plausible, if speculative, notion that the issue in
Augenblick may belong to that exclusive club of jurisdictional controversies capable of inflaming political sensibilities. Reaching the
Court at the height of American military involvement in Vietnam,
the issue of expanding civilian review of military justice may have
been thought especially sensitive at a time when public opinion
concerning the proper role of the military in civil society, and vice
versa, was extremely volatile. Similar jurisdictional issues were
dodged five years later in Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech; 149 not
until 1975, after the cessation of United States military activities in
Southeast Asia, did the Court directly address these jurisdictional
problems. 150 From this perspective, the Court's repeated avoidance
of the jurisdictional issue first raised in Augenblick was consistent
146 Id.

351-52.
147 Judge Adams of the Third Circuit, observing that "jurisdiction is a coat of
many colors," has cited Augenblick as suggesting a malleable concept of jurisdiction.
Brown v. United States, 508 F.2d 618, 630 n.5 (3d Cir. 1974) (Adams, J., concurring), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1027 (1975). The problem here is to determine the
limits of that plasticity.
148 Counsel for Augenblick asserted in their brief that if the Court were to find
that the Court of Claims had in fact been deprived of its jurisdiction (a result they
considered unlikely in light of the relevant legislative history), then the relevant
provisions were unconstitutional. Brief for Respondent Augenblick, United States v.
Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969), excerpted in 21 L. Ed. 2d 873-74 (1969).
149 418 U.S. 676 (1974).
150 See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 745 (1975).
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with its steadfast refusal to open its doors to the voluminous litigation spawned by the Vietnam conflict. 151
By comparison with the jurisdictional issues, the merits in
Augenblick, although by no means determined by precedent as in
Avrech or Norton, admitted of a facile resolution. Although the
Court readily dismissed the claims as failing to allege defects of a
constitutional nature, it nonetheless felt obliged to consider at some
length the proper scope and import of the Jencks Act, 152 and in the
process offered some observations that are frequently cited as prece53
dent by lower courts.
Unlike many other hypothetical jurisdiction cases, the decision
in Augenblick appears not to have been influenced by any inadequacy in the record, briefs, or argument that might have hindered a
judicious resolution of the jurisdictional question. On the contrary,
the jurisdictional issue was the subject of the petition for certiorari
and was fully argued. Nor can Augenblick be explained, as has
been attempted,' 54 as a product of the policy of avoiding decision
of constitutional issues, because both the jurisdictional and substantive contentions involved constitutional interpretation.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to articulate guidelines
for the use of hypothetical jurisdiction that would elucidate the
decisional principle in Augenblick, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia listed the requisite elements in Adams v.
Vance. 5- Drawing together Supreme Court precedents, Judge
Leventhal announced in a footnote that
[w]hen the merits of a case are clearly against the party
seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction, the jurisdictional
question is especially difficult and far-reaching, and the inadequacies in the record or briefing make the case a poor
vehicle for deciding the jurisdictional question, we may
'15 See Sugarman, Judicial Decisions Concerning the Constitutionality of United
States Military Activity in Indo-china:A Bibliography of Court Decisions, 13 CoLtM.
I. TnANSNAT'L L. 470 (1974).
15218 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976).
'53 393 U.S. at 354-56. See, e.g., United States v. Warme, 572 F.2d 57, 62 n.6
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); Armstrong v. Collier, 536 F.2d 72,
77-78 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 651-52 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
' 54 Weckstein, Federal Court Review of Courts-Martial Proceedings: A Delicate

Balance of Individual Rights and Military Responsibilities, 54 Mm. L. REv. 1, 43-44

(1971); Note, Civilian Court Review of Court Martial Adjudications, 69 COLum. L.
REv. 1259, 1271-72 (1969).

In Adams, the court of appeals found it
'15570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
unnecessary to determine whether the request for relief involved a political question
because the plaintiffs bad failed to make the requisite "extraordinarily strong" showing on the merits. Id. 954-55.
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rule on the merits without reaching the inappropriately
presented jurisdictional contention.156
The primary contribution of this formulation is the "clearly
against" standard it applies to the merits. 1 57

That standard accu-

rately describes the nature of the substantive issues posed in Augenb lick as well as those in the cases discussed earlier. It fails, however,
to account for cases that go further than Augenblick and employ
hypothetical jurisdiction to decide cases on substantive merits that
are difficult by any reasonable standard.
D. The Hard Case
Ripon Society, Inc. v. National Republican Party 158 is a leading example of a case presenting difficult substantive, as well as
jurisdictional, issues. The plaintiffs alleged that the formula for
allocating delegates to the Republican National Convention denied
them equal protection of the laws. This claim met with partial
success in the district court and before a panel in the court of appeals. 5 9 After a rehearing en banc, however, the court of appeals
vacated the decision of the panel and entered judgment for the
defendants. In addition to assuming political question justiciability, 6 0 the court en banc assumed subject matter jurisdiction
arguendo. Of ten judges participating in the decision, only five
concurred in the court's opinion dismissing on the merits. Four
concurred in the result, but would have dismissed on the jurisdictional questions; 161 one dissented. If under these circumstances the
merits may still be said to be "clearly against" the plaintiffs, then
the term loses whatever usefulness it might have in determining
which cases are appropriate for the use of hypothetical jurisdiction.
The defendants in Ripon Society argued that the lack of any
state action deprived the court of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3). Rejecting alternative bases of jurisdiction, the court assumed, without deciding, that state action was necessary to § 1343(3)
1506 Id. 954 n.7 (citations omitted).
157By definition, every hypothetical jurisdiction case involves difficult and farreaching jurisdictional issues. The adequacy of the record and briefing, although
often an element, is clearly not essential, as Augenblick demonstrates.
158525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933
(1976).
159 Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 369 F. Supp. 368 (D.D.C.
1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 525 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on rehearing en bane, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
160 See text accompanying notes 192-94 infra.
161 Of the four judges concurring in the result, two agreed with the majority
opinion's views of the merits.
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jurisdiction and that state action was present in this case. 1 2 If, as
the court assumed, state action was necessary to the court's jurisdiction, then the jurisdictional question raised the constitutional
problem whether a national political party, in apportioning delegates to its national convention, is subject to the strictures of the
fourteenth amendment. 1 3 Rather than tackle that weighty matter,
the court preferred to confine itself to the narrower question, also
of constitutional import, whether the procedure under attack was
indeed violative of the equal protection clause.
Whether or not Ripon Society is acceptable as a legitimate
exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction, it accurately demonstrates the
appropriate test: hypothetical jurisdiction is justified when, on balance, the jurisdictional questions outweigh the substantive merits in
difficulty and magnitude. This judicial inquiry manifests the
balancing implicit in the Adams v. Vance formula.0 4
The closeness of the question in Ripon Society, demonstrated
by the five-to-five split in the court of appeals, is an indication that
the court was approaching the limits of its discretion to use hypothetical jurisdiction. The further a court is willing to stray from
Judge Leventhal's "dearly against" standard, the more suspect the
use of hypothetical jurisdiction becomes. When a court deals with
momentous issues on the merits, such as the constitutional validity
of the electoral process, the jurisdictional axiom acquires greater
force, and assurances that the court is acting pursuant to jurisdictional authority become more desirable. The balancing analysis,
although it accurately describes the judgment that must be made, is
appropriate only within a limited range. Discretion to exercise
hypothetical jurisdiction, decreasing in inverse proportion to the
weightiness of the issues on the merits, at some indefinable point
must cease to exist.
E. Bypassing the Case or Controversy Requirement
The bypassed issues in all of the preceding cases may be brought
under the broad umbrella of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court
525 F.2d at 576-77 n.26.
163The court of appeals had concluded in two analogous cases several years
before that activities of the major parties constituted state action. See Bode v.
National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1019 (1972); Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971). Decisions of the Supreme Court in the interim,
however, had cast doubt on the validity of these earlier cases. 525 F.2d at 596-98
(Tamm, J., concurring in the result). See Republican State Cent. Comm. v. Ripon
Soc'y, Inc., 409 U.S. 1222 (1972); Brown v. O'Brien, 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
164 See text accompanying note 156 supra.
162
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has intimated, however, that the constitutional "case or controversy"
requirement 165 may also be avoided by a ruling on the merits.
Although not itself an example of hypothetical jurisdiction,
Ellis v. Dyson 166 suggests that federal courts may reach the merits of
a case without resolving doubts about its justiciability. 16 7 In that
case, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that a local loitering ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. Without inquiring
into the continuing existence of a controversy between the parties,
the district court dismissed the complaint because, under controlling
circuit precedent, federal courts were required to abstain.'68 The
court of appeals affirmed without opinion, and the Supreme Court
reversed, based on its reversal in the interim of the circuit court
precedent relied on by the district court.169
The Court implied that the lower courts had been correct to
dismiss the claim without inquiring into its justiciability. Justice
Powell, in dissent, argued that even under then-prevailing precedent
the district court had been wrong to assume justiciability and dismiss on abstention grounds, labelling that procedure "a departure"
from what he thought "to be the settled order of federal adjudication." 170 Justice Rehnquist, concurring, came to the Court's defense and explicitly argued in favor of the district court's assumption
of justiciability, citing cases in which the Court had avoided questions of subject matter jurisdiction. 171
365 "Case" and "controversy," Chief Justice Warren noted, are two words having
"an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexities which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of government." Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968). "Case or controversy requirement" refers to a
collection of judicial doctrines interpreting the limits on federal judicial power
imposed by article M, including the doctrines of standing, mootness, ripeness,
administrative questions, and the rule against advisory opinions. See C. WRIGr,
LAw OF FEDmAL Covras, §§ 12-15 (1976).
166421 U.S. 426 (1975).
167 "Justiciability" is here used to refer to the doctrines collected under the
rubric of the case or controversy requirement and, in addition, the political question
doctrine. See note 165 supra.
168 358 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd mem., 475 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1973),
ied'd,69421 U.S. 426 (1975).
1 The controlling case was Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1972),
in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the principles of
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) applied to threatened as well as pending
state criminal prosecutions. Becker was reversed in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452 (1974).
170 421 U.S. at 450 (Powell, J., dissenting).
171 While it would have been more in keeping with conventional adjudication had . . . [the district] court first inquired as to the existence of a
case or controversy, . . . I cannot fault the District Court for disposing
of the case on what it quite properly regarded at that time as an
authoritative ground of decision.
Id. 436 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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Neither the district court's nor the Supreme Court's opinion in
Ellis v. Dyson is itself an example of hypothetical jurisdiction. The
district court simply ignored the case or controversy problem; the
Supreme Court, far from ignoring it, gave careful instructions that
it be decided on remand. But the implication of the Court, made
explicit by Justice Rehnquist, was that, as with subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts are free to bypass case or controversy contentions when dismissal on the merits is mandated by controlling
precedent.172
Chandler v. Judicial Council173 is also authority for the proposition that a federal court may assume satisfaction of an article III
case or controversy requirement, although in that case there is some
confusion as to whether the Court actually ruled on the merits. 174
Judge Chandler of the Western District of Oklahoma challenged the
power of the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit to order assignment of cases and fix conditions on his exercise of judicial power. 175
He sought from the Supreme Court a writ either of mandamus or
of prohibition directed to the Council. The Judicial Council contended that its actions, purely administrative, had never been reviewed by a court, and that, under Marbury v. Madison,176 the desired writ lay outside the scope of the Court's original jurisdiction.
Surveying the difficulty of the substantive issues, the Court
found it unnecessary to resolve them "because the threshold question in this case is whether we have jurisdiction to entertain the
172 Justice Rehnquist in Ellis, and the courts generally, have assumed that the

same range of discretion should be enjoyed by the Supreme and lower courts alike
in utilizing hypothetical jurisdiction. Considerations of judicial economy, however,
justify allowing the range of discretion to increase with the degree of authority
attaching to the court's judgment, so that it would not be impossible that hypothetical jurisdiction would be available to the Supreme Court yet denied to the
district court when originally hearing the same case.

A decision by a district court is more likely to be reviewed on appeal than a
decision of a court of appeals. When a lower court exercises hypothetical jurisdiction, the reviewing court will be deprived of the benefit of the lower court's
consideration of the bypassed issue. If the reviewing court takes a different view
of the merits or of the jurisdictional challenges, it may have no recourse but to
remand on the jurisdictional issues, thus frustrating the savings in judicial energies

envisioned by hypothetical jurisdiction.
These considerations will not come into play in the easy case, when the court
is confident of being upheld on appeal. When the merits are more substantial,
however, and the use of hypothetical jurisdiction is a close question, then the likeli-

hood of review becomes another reason for confronting the jurisdictional questions.
See text accompanying notes 163-66 supra.
173398 U.S. 74 (1970).
174 It is unclear whether the Court dismissed because the plaintiff had alternative recourse, see id. 86-87, or because the merits of the case were so insubstantial
as to warrant dismissal, see id. 88-89.
175 Id. 82.
1765 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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petition for extraordinary relief." 177 But the question of jurisdiction to review required a determination whether the actions of the
Judicial Council were judicial or administrative in nature, a question going to the "constitutional requirement that such review be
appellate." 178 The Court also declined to answer that question,
concluding that "in the present posture of the case other avenues of
relief on the merits may yet be open to Judge Chandler." 179
This conclusion resembles the rule of equity that refuses equitable relief when the plaintiff has adequate remedies at law. Traditionally, such lack of equity jurisdiction was viewed in terms of
the court's power,180 but the modern approach treats dismissal for
lack of equity jurisdiction as a decision on the merits.'18 That
appears to have been the view of Justice Harlan who, concurring in
the Chandler judgment, criticized the Court for not first determining its jurisdiction. 8- 2 Chandler, so interpreted, stands for the
proposition that federal courts may skip over article III case or
83
controversy questions to dismiss for want of equity.
Although there is thus no Supreme Court opinion unequivocally holding that it is permissible to assume justiciability and
rule on the substantive merits, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia has so held on several occasions. Standing, 8 4 ripe177 398 U.S. at 86.

178 Id.

'79

Id.

180 Z. C

, supra note 46, at 304.

181 Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 69 (1935); Z. CHa=,
supra note 46, at 296-363.
Chief Justice Burger suggested that the merits of Judge Chandlers action were
deficient when he stated that "plainly petitioner has not made a case for the
extraordinary relief of mandamus or prohibition." Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398
U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
182 398 U.S. at 91-93 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).

183 An analogous procedure was employed in United States v. A.T.&T., 551
F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Judge Leventhal, writing for the court, bypassed a
political question issue and, without reaching the merits, remanded with suggestions
for negotiations between the parties to be monitored by the district court. See
generally Comment, United States v. AT&T: Judicially Supervised Negotiations
and Political Questions, 77 CoLum. L. REv. 466 (1977). The parties remained
somewhat intransigent, and on their second trip to the court of appeals, the political
question issue was decided. 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The case is only
superficially an instance of hypothetical jurisdiction: consideration of political question justiciability was merely postponed, not assumed.
184 Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907
(1978); Chinese Am. Civic Council v. Attorney Gen., 566 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
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ness, 18 5 non-mootness, 8 6 and political question justiciability 187 have
all been assumed arguendo, and the cases disposed of on the merits.
For the most part these instances of hypothetical jurisdiction are
unexceptional, and no reason appears for treating justiciability issues
differently from questions of subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed,
the fact that these separate doctrines are partly constitutional in
origin and partly of a prudential nature,1 88 admitting of discretion
in their application, might be taken to render them better suited
than subject matter issues to be bypassed by means of hypothetical
jurisdiction.
The use of hypothetical jurisdiction to avoid political question
contentions must, however, be closely scrutinized. Unlike standing,
ripeness, or mootness, which focus on the plaintiff or the case in
a specific factual context, the political question doctrine attaches
directly to the issues on the merits. 8 9 Roughly speaking, the central
notion of the doctrine is that there exist certain questions that cannot be judicially resolved, either because they have been textually
committed by the Constitution to a coordinate branch of government or because various prudential considerations, arising from the
separation of powers and the inherent limitations of the judicial
process, render those questions unfit for judicial determination. 190
When a court assumes arguendo the nonexistence of a political
question and decides a case on its merits, a logical conflict is created.
The issue purportedly reserved-whether the controversy on the
merits is a proper subject for judicial resolution-has in fact been
decided in the affirmative. The very act of decision implies that
the merits can be and have been resolved judicially. Hypothetical
jurisdiction with respect to political questions is therefore logically
barred, because deciding the issue on the merits necessarily implies
a decision that no political question exists. 91
185 Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907
(1978); Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (1977) (Leventhal, J., concurring).
186 Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 543 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
187 Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907
(1978); Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v.
National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
933 (1976).
88
1 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968).
189 See Scharpf, supra note 23, at 537-39.
190 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). One of those prudential considerations, the notion that a court cannot decide a case when there are no judicially
manageable standards to guide its decision, is frequently considered to be a third
strand of political question analysis. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939);
G. GuNTEE, CAsEs AND MARLAuvs ON CoNsTrruoNAL L w 1617-22 (1975).
191 justices Harlan and Stewart expressed a similar skepticism at the Court's use
of hypothetical jurisdiction in Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156 (1968).
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This result is demonstrated by Ripon Society, Inc. v. National
Republican Party.192 Confronted with the defendant's objection
that the merits of the case posed a political question, the court assumed justiciability without deciding it and denied relief on the merits, perceiving no offense against the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In the court's view, finding a political
question would have required "the more drastic step of holding that
we would never be competent to reach a contrary conclusion." 193
This language implies that, at least in that case, the court thought
itself competent to render a decision and that consequently no
nonjusticiable political question was at stake. 19 4
The approach in Ripon Society is ultimately indistinguishable
from cases in which the Supreme Court, although recognizing the
force of the political question argument, has nevertheless found
There the bypassed issue was one of subject matter jurisdiction-whether the
seventh amendment prohibited appellate review of a district court's refusal to set
aside a verdict for excessiveness. While Justice Harlan stopped at expressing his
inability to understand the Court's 'legal gymnastics," id.163 (Harlan, J., dissenting),
Justice Stewart went on to state that by proceeding to the merits the Court had
necessarily decided the jurisdictional point. Id. 164 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).
Although the practical effect of the Court's avoidance guaranteed as effectively
as any decision that appellate review of such trial court rulings would continue
unabated, as a matter of analysis, this Comment must take issue with Justice Stewart's
position. To say that reaching the merits necessarily implies a finding of subject
matter jurisdiction, despite an express disclaimer, is to subscribe in full to the jurisdictional axiom and the notion that jurisdiction is a logically necessary condition of
deciding a case on the merits. Modem developments in jurisdictional practice have
significantly eroded that view and dispelled its fascination with a logico-mathematical
approach to jurisdictional concepts. See Parts I & II supra.
In this regard, subject matter jurisdiction and the case or controversy requirement must be distinguished from the political question doctrine. No logical necessity
binds the former to the determination of the merits of a case. But the unique
nature of the political question inquiry, which looks to the issues on the merits, is
such that adjudication of the merits of the controversy logically implies a finding
that no non-justiciable political question exists. Hence the logical difficulty in using
hypothetical jurisdiction to avoid political question objections is inescapable.
It has been argued that standing decisions can best be understood as in fact
disposing of cases on their merits. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative
Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974).
To the extent that this is true, courts that purport to assume standing without
deciding it must also be seen as merely going through the motions of hypothetical
jurisdiction.
192525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976). See
text accompanying notes 158-63 supra.
.93525 F.2d at 578 (footnote omitted).
194 Professor Wright's comment on this procedure, as ambivalent as is the
courts, suggests the same result: "The objection that political questions are nonjusticiable, and accordingly should be dismissed without determination of the merits,
is no stronger than the underlying conviction that at least questions at the core of
the possibly nonjusticiable area can presently be answered." 13 Wiacr & MruEu,
supra note 15, § 3534, at 174 (Supp. 1978).
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room for limited judicial review. 195 This cautious approach, although perhaps bearing some resemblance to hypothetical jurisdiction, represents nothing more than a carefully limited finding of
justiciability that reserves judgment on other cases and situations
not presented. By contrast, use of hypothetical jurisdiction does
not resolve the jurisdictional issue, but disposes of the case on the
merits, which are separate and distinct. Because of the peculiar
nature of political question justiciability, hypothetical jurisdiction
cannot meaningfully be used with respect to it. It can only engender confusion to purport to invoke hypothetical jurisdiction in
that context, as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has repeatedly done. 196
F. Summary
It is clear, if only from the relative scarcity of cases, that use of
hypothetical jurisdiction is not favored by the courts. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the jurisdictional axiom still prevails
and jurisdictional problems must be resolved before reaching the
merits. Judicial power to exercise hypothetical jurisdiction exists
only when a case poses a jurisdictional question that is difficult and
far-reaching. The logic of hypothetical jurisdiction requires that it
be available only when the merits are decided against the party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction. Given these two prerequisites,
judicial discretion to exercise hypothetical jurisdiction involves a
balancing test that weighs the relative difficulty and magnitude of
the jurisdictional questions against the substantive issues. The
strongest case for its use occurs when dismissal on the merits is
clearly required by valid precedent. Even when the merits are not
thus "insubstantial," hypothetical jurisdiction is possible when the
merits are clearly against the party asserting jurisdiction. Although
it is within a court's discretion to exercise hypothetical jurisdiction
when the merits are not so easily resolved provided that the balancing test is satisfied, caution must be observed as the merits increase
in magnitude and complexity. At some point, the utility of hypothetical jurisdiction vanishes and the limits of discretion are transgressed.
One factor that, although not essential, is often present and
may serve to tip the balance in favor of hypothetical jurisdiction, is
19 5 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).

Accord, Mathews v. Diaz, 426

U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976).
196 See Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
907 (1978); Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v.
National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.

933 (1976).
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inadequacy in the record, briefing, or argument, which makes the
case a poor vehicle for dealing with weighty jurisdictional problems.
Except for issues of political question non-justiciability, case or
controversy questions, like subject matter jurisdiction, are amenable
to hypothetical jurisdiction.
IV. Edwards v. Carter RECONSIDERED
The potential for abuse inherent in hypothetical jurisdiction is
nowhere more strikingly illustrated than in the court of appeals'
decision in Edwards v. Carter.197 Faced with complex jurisdictional
challenges to standing, ripeness, and the existence of a non-justiciable
political question, 198 a strongly divided court ignored the threshold
questions and proceeded to dismiss on the merits.
The court's attempt to bring itself under the rule enunciated
in Adams v. Vance 199 by characterizing the merits as "so clearly
against the parties asserting jurisdiction" 200 was somewhat disingenuous, as its own opinion demonstrates. Although it had been a
topic of concern at the Constitutional Convention and among the
ratifying states, 20 1 the use of the treaty power to dispose of federal
property had never before been the subject of a constitutional holding.20 2 It had been viewed in various ways by esteemed constitutional scholars,20 3 and examination of Supreme Court precedent 204
and past practice yielded no uniform approach. 205 Judge MacKinnon's thorough and ardent dissent, if not ultimately convincing,
left no doubt that the substantive issues were by no means "clearly
206
against" either party.

Justification for the court's procedure of assuming jurisdiction
arguendo, although not forthcoming from the Adams v. Vance
standard, might nevertheless be achieved if the balancing analysis
were to show that the magnitude and difficulty of the jurisdictional
197580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).
98
See text accompanying notes 1-8 supra.

3

199 570 F.2d 950, 954 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see text accompanying note
156 supra.
200 580 F.2d at 1057.
201 Id. 1059-61.
202 Id. 1061.
203 Id. 1057 n.4.
204 Id. 1061-63.
205 Id. 1063.
206 Id. 1064 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
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questions were relatively greater than the constitutional issue on the
merits. At the outset, the fact of multiple jurisdictional issues suggests caution. Even if one or two of these were of great complexity
or far-reaching, dismissal might still have been predicated on the
third, making it unnecessary to decide the others. Only if each
jurisdictional issue, standing alone, either outweighed the gravity of
the issue on the merits or posed no obstacle to jurisdiction, would
the balancing test have been satisfied.20 7 Moreover, even if all three
jurisdictional questions passed that test, if any one provided a nonconstitutional ground of dismissal, then the policy of avoiding constitutional adjudication unless absolutely necessary would have dictated dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Given the largely
prudential makeup of the standing, ripeness, and political question
doctrines, this hurdle to the exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction
assumes large proportions.
It is doubtful that the threshold questions in Edwards v. Carter
were so novel or difficult as to justify the use of hypothetical jurisdiction. The court of appeals had addressed the issue of legislator
standing on several prior occasions, in cases in which the merits
were of no greater import than the issue of the scope of the treaty
power.208 On this issue alone the court could have dismissed the
action by adopting the opinion below. The ripeness problem posed
in Edwards, although perhaps a close call, revealed no special doctrinal difficulties that would create pressure for avoidance. 209 No
2

o By comparison, in Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d

567 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976), a "hard" hypothetical
jurisdiction case, the court at least felt obliged to decide the standing issue with
respect to several of the plaintiffs, observing that "[wie would not wish to rule one
way or the other in this case without satisfying ourselves that that [standing]

requirement had been met." Id. 571 (footnote omitted).
2
o Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Metcalf v. National
Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d
430 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Public

Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mere., 515 F.2d 1018
(D.C. Cir. 1975).

Since Edwards, another congressional standing case has been

decided.
Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See generally Note,
Congressional Access to the Federal Courts, 90 HAzv. L. BEav. 1632 (1977).
209 Counsel for the President contended that the case was premature because
the Senate had not yet given its consent to the treaty. The district court found the
lack of ripeness a factor in rendering the injury to the plaintiffs too abstract and
speculative to confer standing. Pointing to the possibilities that the House could
approve a property transfer, that the Senate could enact treaty amendments, reject

the treaty, or adopt amendments unacceptable to Panama, and that diplomatic
complications could arise before or after ratification, the district court noted:
Postulating that these events will not come to pass, plaintiffs deny that
a judicial opinion will be only advisory at this point in time. The Court
is not prepared to second-guess the political contingencies inherent in the
treaty making and legislative processes. Nor can the Court now assess
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reason appears why the political question challenge was necessarily
of greater scope than the constitutional issue actually decided by the
court. 210

The issue whether the President's making of a treaty is

immune from judicial review while the treaty-making process is still
going on is arguably narrower in scope and less difficult than the
issue of the proper extent of the treaty power relative to the disposal
power of Congress. 1 1 Nor was there any inadequacy in the record
or briefing, as the jurisdictional issues were fully litigated in the
district court and the court of appeals.
That a balancing of the issues posed by Edwards v. Carterfails
to justify the court's wholesale exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction
is an almost inescapable conclusion. This criticism is supported
by the court's own brief discussion of its procedure, which manifests
an eagerness to reach the merits, fueled by considerations apart from
the subtlety and far reach of the threshold issues.21 2 The court's
plaintiffs' contention that ratification means a fait accompli, protected from
judicial interference.
Edwards v. Carter, 445 F. Supp. 1279, 1286 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).
For the view that standing probably should have been granted, but that the
court of appeals should have dismissed the case on ripeness grounds, see Case
Comment, Transfer of the Panama Canal by Treaty Without House Approval:
Edwards v. Carter, 92 HAv. L. REv. 524, 529-31 (1978).
210
See text accompanying notes 189-96 supra.
211 The representatives sought, in effect, a declaratory judgment that the President had gone about making the treaty in an unconstitutional manner. Although the
courts are often called upon to interpret treaties once made, it is another thing
entirely to engage in pronouncements on the constitutional soundness of a treaty
still in the formation process. That function, it can be argued, is committed by
article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution to the Senate, in its advice and
consent capacity.
In addition to this textual commitment element, various prudential considerations
arguably rendered the case non-justiciable. For example, a court judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs might have created an embarrassing situation for the President and
destroyed a delicate diplomatic balance. If the disposal power were held to be
exclusive, as the representatives urged, and the property transfer to require a vote by
the full Congress, there would remain the question whether the House was entitled
to vote before the Senate, simultaneously with the Senate, or only after the treaty
was ratified. Might the President merely present legislation implementing other
aspects of the treaty, on the theory that congressional approval of the property
transfer could be inferred from passage of the overall package? These questions of
the timing of submission of a treaty to the Senate and implementing legislation to
Congress are political judgments that require a delicate sensitivity to national and
international complications, and that lack judicially discoverable or manageable
standards. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). However these contentions might have been resolved, they were not of the sort that should be bypassed
by means of hypothetical jurisdiction. See text accompanying notes 189-91 supra.
212 In addition to its argument on the merits, appellee has presented
several substantial and complex challenges to the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to adjudicate the merits of the constitutional question presented in
this case. We refer not only to the contentions as to lack of standing, but
also to the arguments that appellants' action is both premature and
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stated concern over the possibility of a remand and further lengthy
proceedings and the allusion to "time constraints imposed by the
immediacy of Senate action on the treaties" 213 indicate a desire to
put an authoritative end to the litigation before the treaty came to a
vote in the Senate, and to disperse the cloud of constitutional doubt
overhanging the President's choice of the treaty-making procedure. 214
Depending on one's jurisprudential ideology, such concern with
the public or political interest of a case either smacks of the worst
sort of judicial politicking or embodies the highest form of judicial
statesmanship. Here there is no need to choose sides, for this
Comment is not concerned with the result in Edwards v. Carter, nor
with the fact that the court reached the constitutional question.
The problem lies solely in the use of hypothetical jurisdiction to
proceed to resolution of the merits.
Judicial authority depends "altogether on the force of the
reasoning by which it is supported." 215 To decide the grave matters
presented by Edwards without a clear showing of necessity can only
lead to disrespect for the judicial process. Thus the utility of hypopresents a nonjusticiable political question. Deciding only the jurisdictional
issue before us could result in this court, or the Supreme Court, remanding
the case for further proceedings either on the merits or on jurisdictional
issues. Because the merits of this controversy present a pure question
of law, with no need of a hearing for fact development, because these
merits are so clearly against the parties asserting jurisdiction, and because
the judgment appealed from was based on only one of several asserted
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, we believe it is appropriate to proceed
directly to the merits of this case. This conclusion is bolstered when the
time constraints imposed by the immediacy of Senate action on the treaties
are considered.
Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907
(1978).
213 Id. 1057. Had the court decided in favor of Representative Edwards, its
concern over prospective Senate action would have been understandable. But given
that the complaint was to be dismissed, it is difficult to comprehend the necessity
for haste, unless the court was worried lest the Senate vote without benefit of its
advice. Furthermore, the inevitable petition for review by the Supreme Court
ensured that the court of appeals' determination would not finally dispose of the
case. In fact, the Senate consented to the treaty on April 18, 1978, 124 CONG. Ezc.
S5796 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1978), and the Supreme Court did not deny certiorari until
a month later, on May 15, 1978. 436 U.S. 907 (1978).
214A number of prior attempts to obstruct the progress of the Panama Canal
Treaties had failed. Idaho v. Vance, 434 U.S. 1031 (1978); McClure v. Linowitz,
No. 77-436 (D.D.C. May 11, 1977); Helms v. Vance, No. 77-83 (D.D.C. Mar. 23,
1977), aff'd, No. 77-1295 (D.C. Cir. May 3, 1977), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907
(1977); Drummond v. Bunker, No. 76-0353-B (D.C.Z. Jan. 11, 1977), aff'd, 560
F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1977). In the most recent effort, decided after Edwards, the
plaintiffs were found to lack standing. Mease v. Heinz, 80 F.R.D. 119 (E.D. Pa.
1978).
21
5 Wechsler, supra note 102, at 17 (quoting the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting)).
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thetical jurisdiction is at its maximum when the substantive issues
are of small stature. 216 When, as in Edwards v. Carter,the public
interest is intense, exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction fosters legitimate fears of "free wheeling interventionism" and judicial ex217
pediency.
CONCLUSION

Hypothetical jurisdiction-the practice of assuming jurisdiction
arguendo and disposing of a case on the merits-has developed in
federal courts as an intuitive and practical exception to the rule that
questions concerning the court's jurisdiction may be raised and must
be noticed at any time prior to final judgment or on appeal. This
Comment has explored the policies underlying use of hypothetical
jurisdiction and has distilled limits on its use from a survey of
the cases.
The exception that hypothetical jurisdiction carves out of the
jurisdictional axiom is presaged by and analogous to inroads made
by res judicata, the bootstrap doctrine, the modern expansion of
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, and proposals to foreclose objections to subject matter jurisdiction prior to final judgment. In each
of these areas, principles of sound judicial administration require a
more malleable concept of jurisdiction and its relationship to judicial power than the traditional dogma permits.
Hypothetical jurisdiction stems from the general policy of
avoiding constitutional adjudication unless necessary to the disposition of a case. It conserves increasingly limited judicial resources
and fosters thoughtful and principled handling of important jurisdictional questions.
Hypothetical jurisdiction may be used only when the jurisdictional questions are difficult and of great consequence and the substantive merits are adverse to the party asserting jurisdiction. Once
these two prerequisites are satisfied, the decision to exercise hypothetical jurisdiction depends upon whether the threshold jurisdictional issues outweigh the merits in magnitude and complexity. If
consideration of the substantive issues has been foreclosed by controlling Supreme Court precedent or if the merits are clearly against
the party invoking the court's jurisdiction, then exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction is well within the court's discretion. As the
substantive issues increase in weight and difficulty, so does concern
21

6 See text accompanying notes 163-66 supra.

2 t

See Gunther, supra note 102, at 25.
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over possible lack of jurisdiction; as a result, hypothetical jurisdiction concomitantly becomes less legitimate.
Case or controversy issues, as well as subject matter jurisdiction,
may also be bypassed by means of hypothetical jurisdiction, with the
exception that the political question doctrine cannot meaningfully
be avoided by an assumption for the purpose of argument.
A narrow exception to traditional canons, hypothetical jurisdiction contains great potential for abuse. When the substantive
issues are of great import, the temptation to decide them may be
strong, and glib abuse of the hypothetical jurisdiction technique
can satisfy that urge. Thus may the limits on federal court jurisdiction imposed by the Constitution and Congress be finessed by
means of a logical device.
Edwards v. Carter21 8 amply demonstrates that concern over the
abuse of hypothetical jurisdiction is not idle speculation. In that
case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia passed over
issues of standing, ripeness, and the existence of a non-justiciable
political question to decide a grave and novel constitutional issue
on its merits. Whatever the court's reasons for reaching the merits,
its use of hypothetical jurisdiction to do so is not likely to increase
respect for the judicial process.
Hypothetical jurisdiction provides a useful technique for improving the quality and efficiency of judicial administration. Properly used, it can promote the development of sound jurisdictional
doctrine. If, however, the limits on its exercise are not observed,
hypothetical jurisdiction can be used to assume restrictions on federal judicial power out of existence, and thereby to unravel the
constitutional fabric, stitch by stitch.
218

580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).

